In the end of 2024, when the trade war between the US and China accelerated its pace, Chinese President Xi Jinping took a decisive diplomatic step towards South-East Asia. His trips to Vietnam, Cambodia and Malaysia were not only courtesy trips, but it was a clear indication of China’s geopolitical rehabilitation. In the region where the forces such as the US and Japan considered in their strategic influence, China not only strengthened its grip through economic investment, but also gave a well-organized political message-that it wants to be an unknown partner of the region, but it wants to become its future-maker.
It is part of a decisive change in China’s foreign policy, where it works with strategic pressure, not only an economic partnership. But this inclination is worrying for these countries despite being beneficial. In the backdrop of the South China Sea dispute, this diplomacy of China seems to be operated by realistic thinking where there is a “reward” in the form of “reward”, so geopolitical pressure and military appearance in the form of “punishment”.
Even though President Xi has been welcomed warmly in Vietnam, a wall of mistrust has always stood between the two countries. Border disputes, marine tension and historical conflicts have always kept Vietnam a cautious in increasing the proximity with China. But Vietnam is in search of a balance for its development amid growing tension between the US and China. China is trying his best to turn this opportunity in its favor. The picture is different in the context of Cambodia. The influence of China there is clear and undisputed.
Whether it is the creation of military bases or investment in special economic sectors – Kambodia’s political power has deepened Beijing’s hold. This is why Cambodia’s inclination is often seen in favor of China in any joint rhetoric or collective strategy of Asean, which also puts a question mark on regional unity. In Malaysia, China has introduced its image as a development colleague. Investment of Beijing in railways, ports, and energy projects promises to give economic pace to this country. But the Malaysia government has also repeatedly indicated that it is not ready to bow down to China’s terms. In this balanced role, Malaysia has been forced to think of China’s ‘BREI’ resolutions again.
This diplomatic initiative of Xi Jinping comes in that major perspective of the time when the competition of technical and economic domination between the US and China is continuously increasing. This competition is no longer limited to tariff or chip construction, but has expanded to green energy, digital fields, data security and global supply chains. The US has activated the ‘Indo-Pacific’ strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, while China is responding to its investment and appearances in South-East Asia. As part of this strategy, China has also intensified its ‘reward and punishment’ model.
On the one hand, China promises to cooperate with ASEAN countries, investment, trade, vaccination, tourism and infrastructure, while on the other hand the countries who disagree with its words, along with them, uses aggressive naval activities, arrests, and economic sanctions in the South China Sea. This strategy is a deep interpretation of Chinese realism, which focuses on ‘power-demonstration’, more than power-balance. The situation in the South China Sea is the biggest examination of this diplomacy. Questions of abundance of natural resources, strategic importance and freedom of shipping in this region make it the center of international geopolitics. China has established military bases by constructing artificial islands and repeated the claim of its so-called ‘Nine Dash Line’, which has been rejected by the International Tribunal. Despite this, Beijing is not ready to retreat on the issue.
This situation is uncomfortable for Asean. On the one hand he wants to take advantage of China’s economic opportunities, on the other hand he wants to protect himself from his aggressive regional strategy. But the real challenge is that ASEAN is not unanimous. Countries like Cambodia and Laos are in favor of China, while the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia disagree with its policy. This fragmentation has weakened ASEAN’s collective strategic ability. Meanwhile, this development is also worrying for India. China’s growing closest closest challenge the ‘Act East’ policy of China with the developments of the South China Sea and ASEAN. India should no longer depend on cultural and historical relations, but will have to increase its activity in investment, technology partnership and maritime diplomacy. The Indian Navy will have to indicate through regional presence that India is a serious, permanent and strategic partner in South-East Asia.
The biggest challenge before Asean is how to protect his long -term interests. Can he take advantage of China’s economic cooperation, without his diplomatic hold? Can he create a multilateral balance with partners like America and India? The answer to these questions is not easy, but is necessary. It is an economic front to say, but it is all entangled diplomacy, military strategy and national sovereignty. This ‘pivot’ of Xi Jinping is not just a journey, a long-term strategic move, which is heard to the politics of South-East Asia, the unity of ASEAN and the strategic depth of India.
ASEAN should not take any decision by just looking at the immediate economic benefits. He should prioritize his strategic autonomy, marine sovereignty and diplomatic freedom. If he is able to do so, then he will be able to become a competent player in China’s diplomatic board.
Asean’s greatest power lies in its collectivity. Despite diverse culture, history and governance systems, this organization has been a model of regional stability and economic progress through solidarity for decades. While geopolitical stress is again moving towards global polarization, ASEAN has the opportunity to not only be limited to the reactive policy, but emerge as an active global player. ASEAN’s collective response in controversial areas like Dakshin China Sea, whether it is a support for global laws like the Code of Conduct (CODE of Conduckerct) It can give a message to Beijing that it will no longer be easy to challenge regional sovereignty. If ASEAN raises collective strategic voice by placing its differences in the background, it can neutralize China’s ‘divide and rule’.
The position of ASEAN becomes even more important in the multi -polar world. Partners such as America, Japan, India, European Union and Australia – who are in favor of stability and freedom in the region – see Asean as a reliable and equal partner.
India especially wants to deepen cooperation with ASEAN under its ‘Act East’ and ‘Sagar’ approach. In areas such as digital connectivity, green energy, disaster management, and marine security, ASEAN can balance with these partnerships with these partnerships. If ASEAN adds its collective power with awareness, clever strategy and multilateral partnership, it can not only face China’s challenge, but can also become the creator of a new Asian balance.
Harsh Pandey is a PhD researcher at the School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi.
