The Ukraine crisis has reached a critical juncture. First Russia recognized two separate areas called Donetsk and Luhansk, then attacked Ukraine to ‘demilitarize’ (demilitarize). Moscow’s decision goes against Europe’s promise not to commit violence along national borders, which was agreed to in the 1975 Helsinki Accords. Obviously, this is a big challenge for the global order.
The battle for supremacy over the Central European region after the Cold War and the desire to revive the golden Russian past are at the core of the Ukraine crisis. The United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies are united and sanctions have been imposed on Moscow. The Second World War, which started in 1939, and the German war-mindset are being remembered in different ways. The US and NATO are also exploring military options, despite warnings from Russian President Vladimir Putin of dire consequences against any “interference” in support of Ukraine.
But such a struggle for territorial dominance is not limited to Ukraine alone. In the recently concluded Munich Security Conference (MSC), 2022, the way the strained relationship between the US and Russia dominated, similarly the India-China conflict over disputed areas was also in the headlines. The manner in which the deliberations took place at the conference illustrated New Delhi’s assessment of Beijing’s border-breaching.
In the conference, Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar told that the relationship between the two countries has become ‘very fragile’ after Beijing’s violation of border agreements (referring to the Galvan incident in June, 2020). “The issue is that there was peace on the border for 45 years and there was no military casualty there since 1975,” he said.
In the context of the Galwan conflict, the External Affairs Minister said that there were agreements with China not to bring troops along the Line of Actual Control, which Beijing violated. Expressing displeasure over this, China’s Global Times wrote in sharp words on 20 February, ‘New Delhi may try to profit by taking the support of the international community, to strengthen itself and play with fire on the border issue. China needs to beware of such dangerous trend.
The way Ukraine’s crisis unfolded can be said to be an extension of the hybrid war model, which Moscow has successfully carried out under Putin, from Syria to Kazakhstan and now to Central Europe. The development was accompanied by a strong information campaign and full use of frenzy, confirming the brinkmanship strategy. This situation gives some indication to India in the context of conflict with China.
Of course, the Indian Army has vast experience in combating the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from October 1962 to Galwan, but China’s current hybrid model is a new chapter, involving rapid construction of infrastructure, special Taking advantage of the demographics, strengthening domestic laws and playing the victim-card through an innovative information campaign and creating public sentiment. It would not be wrong to say that India has been apathetic about this. The uproar over information after Galvan is an example of this. After violent skirmishes in June 2020, India preferred to forgo some strategic advantage by early 2021 in the hope that it would create the necessary political and diplomatic framework for talks. But more than a year later, that hope of India has been dashed. Beijing claims that New Delhi’s apathetic stance is the reason for this.
As far as India is concerned, it is sad that our strategic communication regarding the Galwan violence and the situation on the Line of Actual Control has been below normal. The central government decided to push aside the challenge of national sovereignty, saying that no Indian territory was lost. Similarly, at an election rally in Hoshiarpur, the Indian Defense Minister also claimed that China has not been allowed to occupy even an inch of land in Galvan. All these statements have confused the common people about the border violations of the PLA. Whereas, senior military officials who served in Ladakh say that China is now physically close to its 1959 claim on the Line of Actual Control.
Regarding the current situation on the Line of Actual Control and India’s strategic situation and patrolling difficulties after Galvan, former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran says, ‘I am not saying that India has lost its rights to patrol some areas of eastern Ladakh. But there is no denying that Chinese soldiers are preventing Indian troops from patrolling areas where they patrolled regularly before the Galwan incident. This situation prevails in Depsang Maidan, Hot Springs and Gogra areas. Undoubtedly, we can say that India has not given up its claim on any area, but the situation on the ground is that there are many areas to which we no longer have physical access.
Clearly, the disputed area is an important aspect of the tense India-China relationship. To deal with a situation like the strategic challenge that has arisen for Ukraine
If India wants to prepare itself, it must
From this, the right lessons will be learned on the front of strategic communication and national security.
(These are the author’s own views)